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Abstract 
 
  Since the USA Telecommunications Act of 1996, the regulatory frameworks, have led to the 
requirement of different policy practices in many countries across the world in order to establish 
sustainable competition in whole telecommunication markets. These regulatory reforms are the 
privatization of the telecom historical integrated monopoly (the incumbent), the independency of the 
regulatory authority, the obligation of transparency of the access price and agreements & the 
unbundling, the separation and the access pricing policies. This paper suggests an empirical 
investigation on both the individual, and the global impacts of these different regulatory policy 
practices on broadband deployment. To this end, we construct a panel data covering 107 developed 
and developing countries over the period of eight years from 2004 to 2011. Using the Instrumental 
variables (IV) & the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with fixed effects and robust to 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors, we show that the relationship between regulation and 
broadband investment is an inverted U shape in developed world while it takes a U form in developing 
countries. This means that in developed countries, a less restrictive regulatory policy spurs broadband 
deployment while more stringent policy discourages innovation in telecom industry. However, in the 
developing countries, the regulation has a strict negative impact on broadband deployment.  
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1 Introduction 
      The apparition of the technologies of the digitalization at the beginning of 1990s has led to the 
emergence of platforms with high capacities of data transmission (the broadband technologies) (ITU 
2012). Compared to the traditional infrastructure technologies (copper telephone lines),the fixed 
broadband platforms (the fiber optic and the digital subscriber lines DSL), as well as, the mobile 
broadband technologies (satellite, Third and Fourth Generation mobile 3G & 4G) allow users to access 
to various voice and data services with high qualities 
1
 (Fornefeld, Delaunay and Elixmann 2008). 
Economic literature (see for e.g., Yongsoo, Tim and Siddhartha 2010; Qiang and Rossotto 2009; 
Koutroumpis 2009) shows evidence about the increasing role of the investment in these advanced 
telecommunication infrastructures (broadband technologies) in driving growth, employment and 
economic development. 
   Fixed broadband infrastructures provide better quality of services but their diffusion is still relatively 
limited compared to mobile broadband technologies (Kumar 2012).  The number of mobile broadband 
subscriptions is about three times greater than the number of fixed broadband subscriptions in 2013 
(ITU 2014). The large costs of fixed infrastructure investment explain the slow diffusion and the 
tardiness of market developments of fixed telecommunication technologies compared to mobile ones.  
  The large amounts of investments required to build these fixed network lines (the local loop) have 
constituted crucial barriers to entry into telecommunication markets, and thereby; justify the 
dominance of the monopoly structure in the past, as well as, the difficulty that the policy makers 
(governments, regulators) actually faces to establish sustainable competition in the fixed 
telecommunication market segments in order to let consumers benefit from diversities in service 
qualities and cost reductions resulting from technology progress. 
 
   During the last two decades, the regulation has played a major role to force the transition toward 
competition telecommunication markets through mandating the policy reforms suggested by 1996 Act 
that lead to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Reference Paper in 1998. 
WTO Reference Paper is a “global consensus” or Agreement on Basic Telecommunications (BTA), 
that countries members or aiming at became members of WTO should follow (Guermazi 2004; David 
1997; ITU 2013). It contains a number of guidelines, which aim at ensuring the world wide 
connectivity through promoting liberalization and competition in telecommunication markets by 
requiring rules that permit to avoid anticompetitive behaviors (Cowhey and Klimenko 2001). 
Four major topics and principles are included in the BTA
2
 that policy makers should follow to 
construct their regulatory frameworks, among that:  
- The obligation to countries members to establish an independent national regulatory authority 
(NRA), that must be independent from government and ministries and exercise their responsibilities in 
entire autonomy. 
- The obligation to regulate the use in efficient and equitably manner the scarce resources by different 
operators. 
- The obligation of provision of universal services by incumbent firm (the historical integrated 
monopoly) to end-users of new entrants having the same characteristics (quality, etc.) that those 
offered to incumbent’s end-users.  
- The obligation of the “Major Supplier” (usually the historical integrated monopoly) to offer access to 
their network infrastructure facilities (interconnection) at non-discriminatory conditions (non-
discriminatory principle) and to publish these interconnection offers (principle of transparency). The 
                                                             
1 In general, a high quality implies high speeds of connection (i.e., Reduced time of download and upload waiting). Among 
high quality services, we cite for example, multimedia applications such as video conferencing, real-time audio streaming, 3-
D applications, telemedicine, video TV movies, Internet Protocol telephony, etc.) 
2 See Guermazi (2004), David (1997) and ITU (2013) . 
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major supplier is the dominant operator, the owner of essential facilities (the telecommunications 
infrastructures) that constitute a necessary input to provide end-users services. Interconnection 
conditions or offers concern the access quality (technical modalities of network access, ..) and the 
price of access to the network service provided to new entrants by the dominant operator, which is 
generally the historical integrated monopoly (the incumbent). The last obligation of the BTA is the key 
to the creation of the competition in end-users services fixed telecommunications markets segments. It 
aims at permitting to new entrants to share the existent network infrastructures owned by the 
incumbent at non-discriminatory access terms.  
   According to WTO Reference Paper, the regulators must prevent (ex ante regulation) and avoid (ex 
poste regulation) the anti-competitors behaviors of the major supplier (the owner of infrastructure 
facilities) by applying the appropriate policy practices. The regulatory frameworks, have led to various 
regulatory access practices including different forms of technical modalities to access to the 
incumbent’s network infrastructures (the unbundling access policies), different models of access 
pricing determination and various models of organization structure of the incumbent firm (separation 
policies). The countries having the most developed telecommunications markets, including the United 
States American (USA), those member of the European Union (EU), Japan and Australia are the firsts 
that are applied these reforms. For developing countries, implementing WTO Reference Paper 
requirements by national governments is seen necessary to attract both domestic and foreign 
investments in telecommunications (David 1997). In particular, Middle East, Asia Pacific, Africa, 
Latin America and Caribbean countries follow the EU model for Access regulatory measures
3
, which 
is considered a middle approach between the full deregulation model of the USA and the 
interventionist model of Japan and South Korea (Cambini and Jiang 2009).  
    The role of the regulation in driving investment in new technologies by both incumbent (upgrading 
the existent networks) and entrants (building new networks) is recently subjects of an extensive 
debate.  Theoretical literature points out on the competition-investment dilemma: access regulation 
promotes competition but may impede investment in network infrastructures (e.g., Laffont and Tirole 
2000; Bourreau, Dogan, and Manant 2010).  The common findings of the recent theoretical literature 
is that the trade-off between regulation and investment is still unsolved, that unregulated access price 
leads to foreclosure but implies better results in term of investment relatively to the regulation case 
(e.g., Foros 2004;  Kotakorpi 2006;  Sarmento and Brandão 2007) and that the requirement of full 
structural separation reduces the investment incentives of the incumbent (e.g., Sarmento and Brandào 
2009; Sarmento 2011). The few works that consider the two kind of investment (incumbent 
investment in network upgrade versus the entrant investment in building their own facilities) show 
ambiguous effects of regulation on investment incentives (e.g., Vareda 2011; Manenti and Scialà 
2013). Baranes, Ben Dkhil and Jebsi (2012) show that the trade-off between competition and 
investment can be only solved in the particular case where the integrated incumbent provides the high 
quality service and the regulator is able to set the access price at cost prior the investment decision.  
  
   Empirical works seem fail to give complete answer to the effects of regulation on telecom 
innovation. In particular, some studies find positive relationship between regulation and investment 
(e.g., Chang, Koski and Majumdar 2003 (the case of Europe); Alesina et al. 2005; London Economics 
2006; Martha 2005; Grosso 2006; Djiofack-Zebaze and Keck 2009; Gruber and Koutroumpis 2012) 
while others find negative effects of regulation on telecom innovation (e.g., Chang, Koski and 
Majumdar 2003 (the case of USA); Distaso, Lupi, and Maneuti 2005; Waverman et al. 2007; 
Friederiszick, Grajek and Röller 2008; Bauer and Shim 2012; Grajek and Röller 2012; Baccache, 
Brourreau and Germain 2013; Nardatto, Valleti and Verboven 2014). However, few studies that use 
measurements of market competition rather than direct measures of regulatory reforms and consider 
non-linear specification show that this relationship is more complex: it is an inverted U relationship 
(see e.g., Heimeshoff 2007; Li 2008; Briglauer, Ecker and Gugler 2013). 
 
     The aim of the current empirical paper is to contribute to this debate by analyzing the individual, 
the joint and the global effects on the deployment of fixed broadband infrastructure technologies of the 
                                                             
3 See ITU (2013) and Cowhey and Klimenko (2001). 
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following regulatory policy practices: the access price policies (Long Run Incremental Cost models, 
Full Distributed Cost, retail-minus, price ceiling, price cap, international benchmark), the separation 
policies (the strongest regulatory models of separation, vertical, functional, separation versus the 
lighter regulatory model , the accounting separation), the unbundling policies (the sub-loop access, 
the bit-stream, line sharing, full local loop unbundling), the transparency of access price, the 
transparency of access agreement, the privatization of incumbent operator and the independancy of 
regulatory authority.  
   We collected data information about these reforms from various sources including the regulatory 
data base of ITU and the officiel reports of NRAs, OECD and others. We constructed a panel 
composed from 107 developed and developing countries countries over the period from 2004 to 2011. 
Following the methodology of Zenhäeusern et al. (2007, 2012 a, 2012 b), we construct an indicator for 
each regulatory reforms to measure the individual impact of each one of this reform and aggregated 
measurements of regulatory policies in order to measure both the join and the global effect of 
regulation.  
   Following a robust econometric methodology, we conclude that we should take into account the 
following considerations: the non-linearity of the relationship between global or the join measurement 
of regulation and the broadband deployment (measured by the total broadband subscriptions), the 
heterogeneities across countries and years, the heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors and the 
reverse causality between regulation and broadband penetration. Using appropriate tests, we show that 
the appropriate methods that permit to take into account these considerations are the following IV 
method & the GMM: Two Stage Least Square with Fixed Effects (FE-2SLS), Two-Step Generalized 
Method of Moments with Fixed effect (FE-2S-GMM) and GMM Continuously Updated Estimator (FE-
GMM-CUE) robust to heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors. Among that, the FE-GMM-CUE is 
the best because it has the properties to provide better results even in presence of weak instruments 
and insufficient number of observations (see Baum, Shaffer and Stillman 2003; Baum (2006); Baum, 
Shaffer and Stillman 2007 and Bascle 2008). As control variables, our models include the total 
population and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
    As regards to the global issue of the regulation on broadband deployment, we obtain an original 
finding: the relationship between regulation and broadband deployment is an inverted U shape in 
developed world while it takes a U form in developing countries. These results mean that in the 
developing countries, a low level of regulation fosters broadband deployment while a restrictive 
regulatory policy impedes investment in broadband infrastructures. However, in developing countries, 
regulation undermines investment in broadband infrastructures. The differences in issues of regulation 
on telecom innovation between developed and developing countries may be due to the fact that in 
general, the existent fixed infrastructures in poor countries are not already sufficiently developed 
compared to those in more reach world.  
   Related previous empirical studies, Friederiszick, Grajek and Röller (2008), Grajek and Röller 
(2012) and Bauer and Shim (2012) are limited to investigate the issues of global effect of regulation in 
the case of developed world (European, OECD countries, USA, Japan), and find a strict negative 
impact of regulation on investment. Compared to our current empirical study, Friederiszick, Grajek 
and Röller (2008), Grajek and Röller (2012) do not take into account the non-linearity of the 
regulation-investment relationship while Bauer and Shim (2012) do not consider the heteroskedastic 
and autocorrelated errors, which are frequent problem in data. .  
  Concerning the individual and the join effects of the regulatory reforms, our results provide more 
support for the inverted U shape relationship. In particular, our findings show that requiring an 
extensive unbundling policy (sub-loop access) or the most stringent separation policies (operational, 
functional or structural separation) undermines broadband investment while a less intensive 
unbundling (full unbundling or bitstream) or a moderate separation policy (accounting separation) 
increases broadband deployment.  As regards to the impact of access price regulation, our results show 
that the higher the intensity of the control of access price, the lower the broadband deployment. In 
particular, in the absence of access price regulation (no control), the broadband deployment is the 
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highest. A moderate access pricing regime that offer certain access margin for incumbent firm such 
that the price cap or the retail minus regulation permits to reach better results in term of telecom 
innovation than adopting stringent access policies (the cost-based models such as LRIC or FDC). Most 
of these results about the issues of the individual reforms confirm both the results of previous 
empirical and theoretical works. 
  Our results on inverted U shape relationship between regulation and broadband deployment support 
the recent findings of researches on the linkage between competition and innovation. In particular, 
Heimeshoff (2007) and Briglauer, Ecker and Gugler (2013) find a closest result, an inverted U shape 
between  competition and telecom investment by using measurement of competition (market share of 
incumbent firm, etc. This is not surprising. Indeed, the relationship between competition and 
regulation is positive because the integrality of regulatory reforms aim at reducing the market power 
and the discriminatory behaviors of the dominant operator (the incumbent), and therefore; promoting 
competition.  
   We find a further support for our results on inverted U shape between regulation and investment in 
broadband infrastructures for developed world in the theoretical and empirical economic literature that 
investigate the linkage between competition and innovation  in a general context (see Aghion et al. 
2005; Innui, Kawakami and Miyagawa 2008; Hashmi 2011; Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt 2013; 
Goettler and Gordon 2014). Aghion et al. (2005) and Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt (2013) interpret the 
overall effect (the inverted U-shape) as the “composition effect” of the two opposite traditional 
extreme effects of competition, Escape versus Schumpeterian effects. In particular, the increasing part 
of the U-curve that depicts the competition-innovation relationship represents the escape effect of 
competition, under which rivals are assumed escaping from competition by innovation to restore a part 
of their historical monopoly profits and therefore innovation is fostered for relatively low degree of 
competition. After a given certain level of competition (saturation point), the Schumpeterian effect will 
dominate because for relatively high degree of competition, rents earned from innovation are not 
sufficiently high to cover the costs of investment incurred by firms.  Therefore, as regards to telecom 
context, our results can be interpreted as follows: for low degree of regulation (therefore low degree of 
competition), infrastructure owner escapes from competition by innovation (escape effect). After 
certain level of regulation, and thereby competition; infrastructure owners’ profits earned from 
broadband deployment cannot cover the costs of investment because the high level of competition 
resulting from severe access regulation policy yields on decreasing retail sales of infrastructure owners 
by reducing final prices (the Schumpeterian effect). 
We also find a support for our results of the U form between regulation and broadband deployment in 
developing countries in the findings of the theoretical growth model provided by Sacco and 
Schmutzier (2011) which demonstrates that this inverted U-shape relationship between competition 
and innovation is only conceivable when firm that invests in cost reduction is more efficient than its 
rivals. However, this relation is negative when firm that invests is less efficient than its competitors. 
Indeed, in the particular case of the telecom context, facts show that the incumbents in poor countries 
are generally less efficient than foreign entrants. 
 
We show further that both the Gross Domestic product (the GDP) and the population size contribute to 
explain broadband deployment. In particular, we find that a 10% increase in GDP per capita 
(population size) leads to an average increase of broadband deployment by around 14% (12.1%). This 
result confirms most previous empirical studies. 
   The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide the data description and the 
statistical analysis. In section 3, we present our empirical model. In section 4, we discuss our 
econometric methodologies and results. In section 5, we conclude and provide our policy 
recommendations. 
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2 Data and Statistique Analysis 
     Dataset used in this study is an annual unbalanced micro-panel composed from about 107 
countries
4
 covering a period of eight years from 2004 to 2011.  Data are collected from various public 
sources including the databases of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (ITU World 
Telecommunication ICT indicators 2011
5
 and ITU regulatory database 2012), the World Bank (WB) 
database, the OECD Communication Outlooks frm 2004 to 2011, and the Plaut Economics Regulation 
data constructed by Zenhäeusern et al. (2007, 2012 a, 2012 b)
6
. We also update data telecom 
performance from the web site of ITU and complete regulatory reform data from international, 
regional and national reports mainly come from ITU, OECD, European Commission (EC), European 
Investment Bank (EIB), European Mediterranean Regulators Group (EMRG), body of the European 
Regulators for Electronics Communications (BEREC) and regulatory authority web sites of different 
countries
7
. 
2.1 Variables 
   We classify variables used in this study into four groups: (1) The telecom performances indicator 
(the dependent variable) (2) the regulation reform measurements (the variables of interest) (3) the 
control and instrumental variables
8
 and (4) dummies for various country classifications. Table 1 
provides a summary of variable definitions sources and construction. The descriptive statistics for 
these variables are reported in the table A/ the Appendix.  
Table 1: Definitions, sources and construction of the variables 
                                                             
4
 In particular, two countries (Haîti & Jamaîca) are not included in estimation results because we do not have completed data for these 
countries. 
5
We are thankful to ITU for sending this database. 
6
 We are grateful to Patrick Zenhäeusern for sending these data. 
7
 Further details about our data source can be obtained by addressing a request to the author. 
8 Instrumental variables are a variables used in estimations. Further details about these variables are provided in the next section of this 
current study.  
Group  Variable Definition Source and 
construction 
(1)  Ln(fixed broadband subscriptions)  The logarithm of the number of fixed broadband Internet 
subscriptions 
ITU 
  Accounting separation Dummy that is equal to one if accounting separation is 
required and zero otherwise 
 
 
 
 
Constructed by 
author following 
the scoring 
methodology of  
Zenhäeusern et 
al. (2007, 2012 a, 
2012 b)using 
mainly 
information that 
come from ITU 
regulatory data 
set.Missing  
information are 
completed by 
author from 
reports of NRAs 
or international 
or regional 
organizations 
(OECD, EMRG, 
BEREC, EC, 
ITU, etc.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 Functional separation Dummy that is equal to one if functional, operational or 
structural separation are required and zero otherwise 
Infrastructure sharing Dummy that is equal to one if infrastructure sharing is 
required and zero otherwise 
Full Local loop unbundling (full 
LLU) 
Dummy that is equal to one if the full LLU is required and 
zero otherwise 
Bitstream access Dummy that is equal to one if the bitstream access is 
required and zero otherwise 
Sub-loop access Dummy that is equal to one if the sub-loop access is 
required and zero otherwise 
Entry regulation Sum of entry regulation dummies (accounting separation, 
functional separation, full LLU, infrastructure sharing, 
Bitstream access and sub-loop access) 
Interconnection regime Indicator  that take one of the following four possibly 
values : 0 if there is no control for access price, 0.5 if the 
access price regulation regime is moderated such as price 
ceiling, retail minus etc., 0.8 if the access price regulation 
is the FDC approach, 1 if the most restrictive access price 
regulation is required to incumbent such as LRIC, LRAIC 
Transparency of interconnection 
agreements 
Dummy that is equal to one if there is a requirement to 
publish interconnection agreements and zero otherwise 
Transparency of interconnection 
price 
Dummy that is equal to one if there is a requirement to 
publish interconnection price and zero otherwise 
Market transparency Sum of dummies of transparency of interconnection 
agreements and price 
Status of SMP operator Dummy that is equal to one if the fixed-line operator 
(incumbent) is 100% state owned and zero otherwise 
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Regulatory autonomous decision Dummy that is equal to one if there is an independent 
regulatory body and zero otherwise. 
Overall reform Sum of all regulatory dummies listed above and the 
interconnection regime indicator 
Overall reform index Overall reform/11 (11 is the number of regulation reform 
considered) 
Entry reform index Entry regulation/6 (the number of entry regulation reforms) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
 Ln(GDPpc) Per capita gross domestic product   
 
WB 
Ln(Population) Population size 
Internet users (per 100 people) Percentage of Internet users 
Regulatory Quality Score that proxy the government ability to require policies 
that promote private sector  
WB 
See Kaufmann, 
Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2010) 
 
Voice and Accountability Score the degree of freedom of expression, association and 
media 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
High income: Non OECD (WB) Dummy that is equal to one if the country in a given year is 
classed as high income (developed) country by the WB and 
it is not a member of OECD, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WB & OECD 
classifications 
High income: OECD (WB) Dummy that is equal to one if the country in a given year is 
classed as high income (developed) country by the WB and 
it is a member of OECD, and zero otherwise. 
Europe & Central Asia (WB) Dummy that is equal to one if the country in ECA region is 
classed as developing country by the WB and zero 
otherwise. 
Middle East & North Africa (WB) Dummy that is equal to one if the country in MENA region 
is classed as developing country by the WB and zero 
otherwise. 
Latin America & Caribbean (WB) Dummy that is equal to one if the country in LAC region is 
classed as developing country by the WB and zero 
otherwise. 
East Asia & Pacific (WB) Dummy that is equal to one if the country in EAP region is 
classed as developing country by the WB and zero 
otherwise. 
Sub-Saharan Africa (WB) Dummy that is equal to one if the country in SSA region is 
classed as developing country by the WB and zero 
otherwise. 
South Asia (WB) Dummy that is equal to one if the country in SA region is 
classed as developing country by the WB and zero 
otherwise. 
2 OPEP Dummy that is equal to one if the country in a given year  
is member of OPEP and zero otherwise. 
OPEP 
classification 
3 Non- OECD Dummy that is equal to one if the country in a given year  
is not a member of OECD and zero otherwise. 
OECD 
classification 
4 Non-EU  countries Dummy that is equal to one if the country in a given year  
is not a member of EU and zero otherwise. 
EU 
classification 
5 Developing countries  (IMF) Dummy that is equal to one if the country in a given year is  
Considered as developing country by the IMF and zero 
otherwise. 
IMF 
classification 
6 Developing countries  (UN) Dummy that is equal to one if the country in a given year is  
Considered as developing country by the UN and zero 
otherwise. 
UN 
classification 
 
 
7 
High income (WB) Dummy that is equal to one if the country in a given year is  
Considered as high income country by the WB and zero 
otherwise. 
WB 
classification 
Upper-Middle income (WB) Dummy that is equal to one if the country in a given year is  
Considered as upper-middle income country by the WB 
and zero otherwise. 
Low-Middle-income (WB) Dummy that is equal to one if the country in a given year is  
Considered as low-middle income country by the WB and 
zero otherwise. 
Low-income (WB) Dummy that is equal to one if the country in a given year is  
Considered as low income country by the WB and zero 
otherwise. 
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2.1 Comparative statistical analysis  
     In this paragraph, we provide a comparative statistical analysis for the evolution of broadband subscriptions 
(the dependent variable) and the overall and the entry regulation measurements (the main variables of interest) 
across the world using appropriate graphs and considering the international and regional country classifications. 
2.1.1 The evolution of fixed broadband subscription across the world 
   The fixed (wired) broadband Internet subscriptions measures total Internet connection subscriptions 
at high downstream speeds (i.e. superior or equal to 256 kbit/s) via fixed Internet technologies (cable 
modem, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), fiber-to-the home/building, etc.)
9
. Otherwise, this indicator 
measures total demand for high
10
 quality Internet connection (retail service) addressed to all operators 
(incumbent and entrants) in a given country during a given year. Recently, most studies consider this 
indicator as the best proxy of innovation in telecom industry (see for e.g., Wallsten (2006), Badran, EL 
Sherbini and Ragab (2007), Waverman et al. (2007), Cambini and Jiang (2009), Bouckaert, Dijk and 
Verboven (2010), Bauer and Shim (2012) and Gruber and Koutroumpis (2012)). The explanations of 
the popularity of this measure are the following: (1) This measure is easy to obtain by regulatory 
national authorities in comparison with other measures (specially the investment in telecom 
services
11
). (2) This indicator is well relevant to explain investment in high quality infrastructures 
(fiber-to-home, etc.). 
     Line charts provided in figure1 illustrates evolution of the total broadband subscriptions per 100 
people in different countries of our dataset over the period from 2004 to 2011. Basing on both the WB 
& the OECD country classifications, high income countries are dived into categories: the OECD and 
the NON-OECD countries while developing countries are grouped by region.  
    Graphs show significant differences between groups of countries, ranging from below 0.8% in Sub-
Saharan Africa to 5.17% in Middle East and North Africa, 6.37% in South Asia, 11.62% in East Asia 
and Pacific, 13.82% in Latin America and Caribbean, and 71.61% in high income countries. Line 
charts also depict that penetration broadband rate in developing countries has increased slowly than in 
high income countries between 2004 and 2011.In general, it seems from this that penetration rate is 
positively affected by income level. Horizontal bar charts (Figure A/Appendix)
12
, that present 
penetration rates from 2004 to 2011 respectively for high, upper-middle, low-middle and low income 
countries, are more convenient to illustrate the strong link between income level and broadband 
penetration rate. In particular, fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people is below 0.7% in low 
income countries and 8% in low middle income countries while rates reach more than 22% in some 
upper-middle income countries and 40% in some high-income countries. However, some exceptions 
appear clearly when considering bar charts for high and upper-middle income countries. In particular, 
penetration rates are low for some high income countries such that Saudi Arabia (below 5.62%), 
Oman (below 1.85%), Brunei Darussalam (below 5.72%) while rates are high for some upper-middle 
income countries such that Lithuania (more than 22.13%), Latvia (about 20.39%), Bulgaria (roughly 
16.44%) and Belarus (around 21.939%). This implies that income level is not the sole determinant of 
broadband deployment. 
                                                             
9  This definition is re-formulated using the note for this indicator (n°I4213TFB) given by ITU World Telecommunication ICT indicators 
2011. 
10
 Broadband Internet is considered as substitute for traditional access service (dial-up access) because it permit to consumers to access to 
high quality retail service (i.e. higher speeds  and other features such that facilitating of the use)  (Sutherland 2007).  
11
 Generally, the infrastructure owners (in most cases, the incumbent, the operator with Significant Market Power (SMP) do not give its real 
cost of investment.  
12
 For space, certain figures and tables are reported in the Appendices. 
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Figure 1: Fixed Broadband Subscriptions per 100 people over 2004-2011 
High-income countries (grouped as OECD & non-OECD)/ other countries (grouped by region) 
Source: the author. 
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2.1.2 The measurements and the evolution of the regulation  
    There are two ways to enter the telecom markets: (1) the service-based entry, in which entrants 
provide their end-user services using the existent facilities of the historical integrated monopoly (the 
incumbent), and (2) the facility based entry, in which entrants provide their services using their own 
network infrastructures. As the facilities-based competition is not generally easy to introduce because 
infrastructure duplications are costly and sometimes not economically efficient
13
, regulators in 
majority of countries are turn on ensuring services-based competition through requiring some 
obligations to incumbent in order to limit the scope of its market power and thereby, prevent its 
discriminatory behaviors and therefore, ensure and promote competition.  In particular, Entrants are 
permitted to share the incumbent’s facilities through requiring access technical policies (certain forms 
of unbundling or infrastructure sharing) against a regulated access price.  
     2.1.2.1 The classification and the measurements of the regulatory reforms: 
   Access regulation policies including various access pricing, unbundling and separation policies can 
be ranged from the weakest to the strongest regulation required to the dominant operator (the 
incumbent). A strongest regulation results in more competition since it reduces the market power and 
discriminatory behavior of the dominant operator and vice versa.  
- The cost-based pricing models such as the long Run Incremental costs (LRIC) which is based on the 
current costs of infrastructure building  and the fully distributed cost (FDC), which is based on the 
historical infrastructure costs, do not permit to incumbent to earn sufficient mark up over the marginal 
cost of access service provision and therefore, these access pricing models should permit more 
competition compared to the non-cost based access pricing policies such as the retail minus, price cap 
and international benchmark which permit to incumbent to earn non negative profits from its access 
activities. Figure 2 provides a classification of access pricing policies from the weakest to strongest 
basing on Zenhäeusern et al. (2012 a, 2012 b) and Mihevc (2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Access pricing policy levels 
Source: author 
 - A Severe unbundling requirement (the sub-loop unbundling) that leads to more technical obligations 
to incumbent against more advantages for entrant relatively to more moderate forms of unbundling 
(full local loop unbundling, line sharing, bitstream) permits to increase competition. Following 
Wallsten 2006  and OECD (2003 a), we classify the unbundling policy with respect to intensity of 
regulation required to incumbent as illustrated in figure 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Unbundling policy levels 
Source: author 
 
                                                             
13 See, Laffont and Tirole 2000. 
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- Partner and Lawyer (2011); Cave (2006) ; Malcolm (2008); OECD (2003 b,  2006, 2011 a) classify 
separation policies as follows: The full structural separation, which consists to prohibit the incumbent 
to provide end-users services, is considered the strongest form of separation required to incumbent 
because it reduces sensibly its market power by limiting the scope of its activity in providing access to 
rivals. The forms of separations (functional or operational separation) that require to incumbent firm to 
separate its retail activities from the wholesale business (providing access services to rivals) by 
creating divisions in its own integrated company are considered a moderate form of separation 
compared to the full structural. The lowest form of separation is the requirement of separation of 
accounts (accounting separation). Figure 4 summarizes this classification.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Separation policy levels 
Source: author 
 Although the differences in the definitions of these various forms of separation, regulatory reports 
usually confuse the following models of separation: structural, functional & operational. Therefore, we 
use a sole binary variable (that we call functional separation) to measure the requirement of one of 
these three form of separation in a given country to a given year (see table 1). 
   We compute the other measurements of regulatory reforms used in this study as descripted in table 1. 
The aggregated measurements proxy the intensity of regulation in a given country for a given year: the 
higher the value of these measures, the higher the intensity of regulation and vice versa. These 
measures therefore can be seen as indirect measurements of intensity of competition in telecom market 
since these regulatory reforms are required to incumbent in order to reduce their market power and 
discriminatory behaviors against their rivals. 
 
   This current study consider both the aggregated measures (overall regulation, interconnection 
market transparency and entry regulation) and the disaggregated measures (accounting separation , 
functional separation, infrastructure sharing, full LLU, bitstream, sub-loop,  interconnection regime, 
transparency of interconnection agreements, transparency of Interconnection price, status Incumbent 
and regulatory autonomous decision of regulation, which are binary variables that take a value of 1 of 
the corresponding reform is required; see table 1). This is another important contribution of this study 
relatively to earlier studies. The previous studies have limited to study the issues of some individuals 
reforms: impact of access price regulation (e.g., Chang, Koski and Majumdar 2003; Distaso, Lupi and 
Maneuti 2005; Waverman et al. 2007; Seo and Shin 2011), the unbundling policies issues (e.g., Grosso 
2006; Wallsten 2006; Baccache, Brourreau and Gaudin 2013; Nardatto, Valleti and Verboven 2014), 
or the separation policies effects (e.g., Viani 2006; Bruno 2012). At our knowledge, only the studies of 
Friederiszick, Grajek and Röller (2008), Grajek and Röller (2012) and Bauer and Shim (2012) have 
investigated the global effects of regulation using the index computed by Zenhäeusern et al. (2007, 
2012 a, 2012 b)  but they do not investigate the individual impact of each reform. Further, in our 
knowledge, the integrality of these studies have studied the impacts of regulation on investment in 
telecommunication infrastructures in the case of developed countries (European or OECD countries) 
but not the case of developing countries, except the studies of Martha (2005) and Gruber and 
Koutroumpis (2012) which only investigate the effects of unbundling policies in the case of both 
developed and developing world. According to our researches, there is no study that investigates the 
impacts of separation and access price regulation in developing countries. 
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2.1.2.2 The evolution of regulatory intensity across countries over the world 
   In this paragraph, we compare and discuss using some graphs the evolution of the regulation 
intensity across countries included in our panel. It appears from the first bar charts (see Graph1/ Figure 
5) that the regulation intensity is on average increasing in income level. Precisely, the high income 
countries have on average the highest regulation intensity. They are followed in the second rang by the 
upper-middle income countries, then the low-middle income and finally by the low income countries. 
This result is not surprising. In fact, implementation of regulation reforms such that unbundling, 
accounting and others types of separation and cost-based pricing or LRIC models is costly. 
14
 
    The second bar charts (Graph2/ Figure 5) show that high income countries that are members of 
OECD are on average the highest regulation intensity. This result is also illustrated by bar charts in 
graph3. This outcome is consistent with the role of OECD in promoting telecom regulation policies to 
ensure competition and to promote broadband roll out. This may be also due to the recent extensive 
telecom regulatory frameworks of European Union since the majority of countries members of OECD 
are also members of EU. Graph4 illustrates this issue. However, it seems from Graph 5 that be 
member of OPEC has no effect in terms of telecom regulation. In fact, the role of OPEC is limited to 
strategies that concerns exportation of petrol. OPEC countries such Saudi Arabia and Oman have high 
income but both low telecom performances and low regulation intensity. This implies that in addition 
to income level, other factors may have an important role in development of telecom industry. These 
factors can be summarized in development level of a given country. However, as noted above in 
paragraph 2.1 the World Bank classifies high income countries level as developed. This is not the 
cases of other world organizations such that IMF and UN.  Graphs 6 and 7 in Figure 5 supports this 
intuition that the development level of a country, that can incorporate factors related to human 
resources such that the level of education and political system in a given country that may be also 
important determinants of regulatory policy introduction. According to OECD (2005), high quality 
staff of regulators ensures high telecom quality regulation. In addition, political environment in a 
given country (political stability, absence of Violence/Terrorism, global regulatory quality, rule of 
Law, control of Corruption, freedom of expression, association and media etc.) guarantees the 
dependency of regulatory authorities, that is necessary to achieve telecom regulation goals consisting 
on improvement of market transparency, effective competition and high quality of telecom services
15
. 
For example, we think that the high regulation intensity in MENA countries (see Graph 4/ Figure 
B/Appendix) is due to political choice that permits high degree of open (especially relations with 
Europe).  The best illustration is Tunisia that introduced unbundling policies, accounting separation 
and cost-oriented models for interconnection charges since 2008. The staff of regulation may also 
explain the high regulation intensity in Tunisia (see Graphs 2 and 3 in Figure C/Appendix, which 
illustrate evolution of regulation measures by country).  
 
                                                             
14
 For example, introducing accounting separation reform implies “adaptation costs for existent accounting systems” 14. Also implementing 
operational, functional or structural separation implies costs of creation of new divisions, units or subsidiaries (costs of construction, costs of 
introduction of new financial, management, information and legal systems, costs of recruitment of new staffs, costs of buying of new 
equipment (software or hardware). For example, applying the full structural separation in 2003 to incumbent firm (Telstra) in Australia 
implies important fixed costs that are estimated to reach about USD 1.9 billion and annual additional costs of about USD 76 million
14
 and 
costs of functional separation of British Telecom in United Kingdom reached GBP 70 million in 2006 (Malcolm 2008). The implementation 
of the full LLU also implies costs such as those related to the maintenance of the copper pair, security, installations of equipment, etc. 
(OECD 2003 a). Introducing LRIC models also require estimating costs incurred by the incumbent and collecting data about demand for the 
telecom services, which implies important information costs for regulator. In general, application of the cost-based access pricing is very 
costly (Malcolm 2008).  
15
 Several empirical studies consider that political variables are important determinants of regulation in telecom industry. We cite, for 
example, Djiofack-Zebaze and Keck (2009), Friederiszick, Grajek and Röller (2008), Grajek and Röller (2012), Gruber and Koutroumpis 
(2012) and Bauer and Shim  (2012). We will discuss later this relation between global political system and telecom regulation later. 
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Graph 1: World Bank classification  
(by level of income) 
 
 
Graph 2: World Bank classification :  
High-income countries (grouped as OECD and non-
OECD )/ other countries (grouped by region)) 
 
 
Graph 3: Classification OECD 
(OECD/ NON OECD) 
 
 
Graph 4: Classification EU/NON EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Comparison between means of regulation measures over the world across different country classifications 
 
Source: the author  
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Graph 5: Classification OPEC/NON OPEC countries 
 
 
 
Graph 6: Classification IMF 
 
 
Graph7: Classification UN 
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3 The empirical benchmark model  
    Following previous empirical studies, telecom performances are a function of regulation reform 
measurements and a set of control variables: 
                            
                                                             
Furthermore, our specifications account for the following considerations: 
(1) The cross-country effect: 
Baltagi (2005) notes that Panel Data have the advantage to control for individual heterogeneity and 
"give more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of 
freedom and more efficiency". Ignoring individual heterogeneity often leads to biased results
16
. 
Therefore, we include dummies for countries to take into account individual fixed effects. 
(2) Temporal effect: 
  Telecom performance indicators vary over time for each country. Then, we introduce year dummy 
variables to take into account the presence of time effects. 
(3) Linearity of the relation: 
 Several empirical papers show that the relationship between regulation reforms and telecom 
performances is non-linear. Therefore, we introduce a non-linear component. In line with previous 
empirical studies such that Heimeshoff (2007) and Bauer and Shim (2012), we assume that this non-
linear component corresponds to the squared of the regulation reform measure. 
(4) Dynamic nature of telecom investment (broadband deployment) 
    In line with number of empirical studies such that Heimeshoff (2007),  Friederiszick, Grajek and 
Röller (2008), Bouckaert, Dijk and Verboven (2010), Bauer and Shim (2012) and Baccache, Brourreau 
and Gaudin (2013), we also consider the long term (dynamic) effect of investment in telecom 
infrastructure (broadband deployment proxy by broadband penetration) by including lagged dependent 
variable in the model. 
In consequence, our empirical benchmark model takes finally the following general form: 
                                                                                              (4.1) 
            is the telecom performance indicator in country i at year t expressed in natural logarithm
17
. It 
represents a proxy of telecom performances, which are the fixed broadband subscriptions.        is a 
vector of regulation measurements. This may correspond to one or more  regulation reform 
measurements (interconnection regime, accounting separation, functional separation, infrastructure 
sharing, full LLU, bitstream access, sub-loop access, transparency of interconnection agreements, 
transparency of interconnection price) or one or more aggregate regulation measurements (overall 
regulation, entry regulation, transparency of interconnection terms) plus square terms (square of these 
aggregate measurements or square of interconnection regime).         is the lagged dependent variable 
(by one year).     is a vector of control variables that capture the impact of other determinants of 
telecom performance, which are the per capita GDP and the population size expressed in natural 
logarithm. The error terms   ,    and     capture respectively time fixed effects (fixed effect for each 
year t), country fixed effects (fixed effect for each country i
18
 and variation of telecom performances 
that is not explicitly included in the model.   is the intercept. The vector of parameters   measures the 
impact of regulation reforms on telecom performance. The vector of parameters   measures the 
contribution of control variables in explication of telecom performance variation. 
                                                             
16
 See Baltagi (2005, pp.18-19). 
17
 The choice of the natural logarithm transformations for our continuous variables is to prevent possibly stationary series and normality data 
problems. Friederiszick, Grajek and Röller (2008)and Grajek and Röller (2012) make this transformation for the same purpose. 
18
   ,        are dumy variables taking value 1 for respectively year t and country i. We drop one of country-specific effects (e.g.,     and one 
of time-specific effects (e.g.,    , to avoid perfect collinearity (Greene 2002, see p.291 and p.118).  
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4 The Econometric methodology  
     Empirical studies reach opposite conclusions about regulation-telecom performances relationship. 
Econometric techniques may be one of the major factor that affect results and conclusions. Therefore, 
we use usual estimators including the simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the fixed effects (FE) 
estimator as well as the Instrumental Variables (IV) and Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) 
that overcome several problems that characterize data. In particular, we proceed as follows. After 
checking and discussing the possibly multi-collinearity problem between the explanatory variables 
used in this study, we begin by applying series of regressions using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
method. Performing a number of tests
19
, we conclude that we should take into account fixed effects 
and control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of error terms. We deal with these problems by 
using robust fixed effects models with cluster on countries (robust FE with clusters). Analyzing results 
obtained by both OLS and robust FE with clusters, we conclude that these estimators not yield 
consistent estimates
20
. According to Baltagi (2005), both OLS and FE yield biased results in the case 
of dynamic specifications.  Further, these usual estimators do not control for the reverse causality 
between regulation and telecom performance, omitted explanatory variables and errors of 
measurements of variables. A number of empirical works (e.g., Alesina et al. 2005; Distaso, Lupi, and 
Maneuti 2005; Waverman et al. 2007; Friederiszick, Grajek and Röller 2008; Li 2008;   Djiofack-
Zebaze and Keck 2009; Bauer and Shim 2012; Grajek and Röller 2012; Gruber and Koutroumpis 
2012; Baccache, Bourreau, and Gaudin 2013; Briglauer, Ecker, and Gugler 2013; Nardatto, Valleti 
and Verboven 2014) point out  on the existence of  two types of problems when analyzing the impact 
of regulation (or competition) on telecom innovation : 
 (1) The reverse or simultaneous causality between regulation and innovation: In fact, telecom 
performances including broadband deployment or subscriptions, affect regulatory decisions. In a given 
country, the regulator decides appropriate regulation reforms following the characteristic of the 
existent national telecom markets (level of competition, level of investment, prices  ...). For example, 
in the United States where telecom markets show sufficient competition, the strategic of regulator 
seem seeking to reduce reforms required to significant market power operators (incumbent firm) over 
time in order to encourage more investments in NGNs. In contrast, in Europe where the facts (prices, 
technology subscriptions, market shares..) show that traditional telecom monopoly has yet a 
significant market power, the regulators focus on promoting service-based competition by requiring 
more reforms to incumbent firms. 
 (2) The omitted regulatory variables: In fact, the collect of precise and complete information about 
telecom regulatory reforms and the construction of relevant measurements for these qualitative 
variables are delicate. In particular, we ignore certain regulatory reforms given the non-availability of 
information. Further, we use generally law texts which only give information about the date of the 
requirement of the regulation reforms rather than the year of its effective implementation or its 
application.    
The most appropriate methods to overcome these two problems in our case are the Instrumental 
Variables (IV) and Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) methods. In particular, we use Two 
Stage Least Square (2SLS), Two Step Generalized Methods of Moments (2S-GMM) and GMM 
Continuously Updated Estimator (FE-GMM-CUE))
21
.   
 
Furthermore, All our estimations with 2SLS, 2S-GMM or GMM-CUE method control for:  
  (1) Fixed effects FE (country and year dummies): Our motivation behind the choice to apply these 
methods with fixed effects instead to first difference is the characteristic of our sample, which is 
                                                             
19
 These tests are: Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test (B-PLM test), Hausman test, the “modified Wald test for group-wise 
heteroskedasticity”, Wooldridge tests for serial correlation (see the diagram reported in the Appendix). 
20
 For space, we do not report the OLS and the robust Fixed estimations. We are limited here to provide the robust results obtained using the 
IV & GMM methods.  
21 All tests, applications, description concerning these methods are accomplished in this paper basing on the works of Baum, Shaffer and 
Stillman (2003); Baum (2006); Baum, Shaffer and Stillman (2007) and Bascle (2008). 
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strongly heterogenous as it includes both developed and developing countries 
22
. In addition, as shown 
later, the inclusion of year effects permit to capture the evolution of broadband deployment over 
period 2004-2011. Further, Hausman tests applied to IV regressions reject its null that differences in 
coefficients of fixed and random IV estimators are not systematic meaning that fixed effect IV 
estimator is preferred to random effect IV estimator.  
(2) Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
23
: Indeed, 
the Pagan-Hall IV heteroskedasticity test, formulated by Pagan and Hall (1983)
24
 , rejects its null 
hypothesis that the errors are homoskedastic and the Arrellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation Arellano 
and Bond (1991)  reject its null hypothesis that there is no first-order correlation between errors. 
 
   Basing on the econometric literature review and developments of Baum, Shaffer and Stillman 
(2003); Baum (2006); Baum, Shaffer and Stillman (2007) and Bascle (2008), we summarize the 
differences between these estimators as follows:  
     ▫ The 2SLS estimates are obtained by applying simple OLS on equation (4.2). If the standard 
assumptions on covariance matrix of error term of main equation (i.e. absence of serial correlation and 
homoskedasticity erros) hold, the 2SLS estimates are more efficient than 2S-GMM estimates, which 
are obtained with respect the violation of these assumptions. In particular, the 2SLS is none other than 
a special case of GMM estimator, that is considered the most efficient estimator if equations (3.2) are 
over-identified, the total number of observation NT is important enough (more than 700 observations), 
the errors are heteroskedastic and autocorrelated, there is a lagged dependent variable, and instruments 
are strong.  
    ▫The GMM-CUE is a GMM applied to Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) 
estimator, which is an IV method that is based on Maximum Likehood (ML) function instead to 
basing on minimizing the sum of squares of errors terms (for example OLS method). The GMM-CUE 
estimator is shown better than 2SLS and 2S-GMM estimators if the instruments are week and the 
number of observations is low enough. 
 
 In general, the consistency of the estimations with IV & GMM depends on the goodness of the 
instruments
25
 used  for the endogenous regressors (the regulatory measurements). Therefore, we 
proceed as follows to ensure the consistency of our results: 
 Firstly, we select the possibly instruments by referring to related literature and econometric theory. 
We use three kinds of instruments, (1) the lagged endogenous regressors which are usually valid 
instruments (see, Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p.743). (2) the Political and institutional indicators: 
Related literature (i.e., Djiofack-Zebaze and Keck 2009;  Friederiszick, Grajek, and Röller 2008, 
Cambini and Rondi 2009; Grajek and Röller 2012; Gruber and Koutroumpis 2012; Bauer and Shim 
2012) suggest that political and institutional characteristics of a given country such that political 
orientation and ideology of political parties (right to left), independence of regulatory authorities and 
political systems (parliament, presidential,..etc.) are the key determinants of telecom regulation. In line 
with this empirical literature, we use the Worldwide Governance indicators, which come from World 
Bank data base
26
 (3) the Internet users per 100 people: Reverse causality from market telecom 
                                                             
22 We are also try the difference GMM but tests show that this method is not appropriate. This may be due to the extreme heterogeneities of 
our panel.  
23
 Results for IV/GMM methods with clusters on countries are similar to those obtained with bw (2). For space, we do not report it. For 
further details about our methodology see the diagram reported in the Appendix. 
24
 Cited by Baum, Shaffer and Stillman (2003); Baum (2006); Baum, Shaffer and Stillman (2007) and Bascle (2008) 
25
 The instruments used must satisfy two necessary conditions:  
    (1) The relevance condition: Each one of instrument must be correlated with the endogenous regressors. A high (low) correlation indicates 
that the instrument is “strong” (“week”) while no correlation implies that the instrument is “irrelevant”. In general, the consistency of 
estimates obtained using the IV techniques depend on instruments ‘strength. The higher the instruments’ strength, the “higher” the 
consistency of the IV estimator.  
(2) The exogeneity condition (also called “orthogonality condition”): the e vector of instruments must be not correlated with the vector of 
error terms of the model.  
26
 Data available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators>. These indicators are constructed by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (For more details, see Kaufmann , Kraay , and Mastruzzi 2010). These indicators correspond to codes of 
replies on the quality of government perceptions according to selected citizen, number of enterprise, and experts. In particular, this dataset is 
composed from six political and institutional indicators: 1- Political stability and absence of violence/ terrorism, , 2-Government 
Effectiveness that measures the perceptions regarding the public service quality and degree of respect of commitment to policies 
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performance to regulation implies that some indicators of telecom performance, such as the Internet 
users per 100 people, may be a good determinant of the regulation policies decided by the NRA 
(relevance condition). However, to ensure exogeneity condition, this variable must be not correlated 
with unobserved factors (error terms of the model) that explain broadband deployment. Diagnostic 
tests show that the “Internet users per 100 people” is a valid instrument for regulatory measurements 
in certain specifications (see next paragraph). 
5 The Estimation Results and robustness checks 
    In this paragraph, we start by presenting our estimation results. Then, we interpret and compare 
these results with results of previous empirical researches. Finally, we check the robustness of these 
results by analyzing the results of the first and second stage diagnostics (i.e. the post estimation 
diagnostic tests). 
5.1 Presentation of results 
   The aim of this study is to examine the role of regulation in driving or delaying innovation in 
telecom industry across the world. To this end, we fitted two sets of regressions.  
- The first one, which incorporates four regressions denoted A, B, C and D, has as goal to analyze both 
individual and global effects of regulation on telecom innovation. Regressions A, B, C and D differ on 
the regulation measurements considered. In regression A, we focus on the impacts of overall 
regulation while in B we are interested in the effects of each one of the following aggregated 
measurements: entry-regulation, market transparency and interconnection regime. The regressions C 
and D provide the specific impacts of the individual reforms. In particular, in regression C, we study 
the particular effects of each one of the following reforms: accounting separation, functional 
separation, Sub-loop access, Transparency of interconnection Agreements, Transparency of 
interconnection price, Status of  SMP operator, Regulatory autonomous decision. In regression D, we 
add the rest of the reforms considered in this study (i.e., Infrastructure sharing, Full local loop 
Unbundling, Bitstream access, interconnection regime, square of interconnection regime). Table 2 
summarizes, for each one of these regressions, results of estimations and post-estimation diagnostic 
tests 
- The second set of regressions that includes three models denoted I, II and III, examines haw can vary 
the global effect of regulation when isolating one or more groups of countries, each one has a common 
characteristic such as income level or appurtenance or not to OECD. In regression I, we interact the 
overall regulation and its square to dummy for country classification by appurtenance or not to 
OECD. In regression II, the overall regulation and its square are interacted to dummy that takes 1 if 
country is classified by the World Bank as high income country. In regression III, we interact the 
overall regulation and its square to dummies for different country classifications by income levels 
(low, low middle, upper middle incomes). Table 3 summarizes results of estimations and post-
estimation diagnostic tests for each one of these regressions.
                                                                                                                                                                                              
implemented by the government , 3- Rule of Low, which proxy the perceptions regarding the applications of lows. 4- Control of corruption, 
which measures perceptions regarding the degree of control of corruption 5- Regulation quality, which proxy the perceptions of government 
ability to implement policies that encourage development of private sector. 6- Voice and Accountability, which proxy perceptions regarding 
degree of freedom of expression, associations and media. However, in this study, we do not use all these six above governance indicators. In 
particular, only Voice and Accountability and Regulation quality are used. Indeed, post estimation diagnostic tests show that only Voice and 
Accountability and Regulation quality are valid as instruments for certain specifications (see next paragraph). Further, we cannot use 
simultaneously these four governance indicators (Government Effectiveness, Rule of Low, Control of corruption and Regulation quality) as 
instruments for regulatory measurements in a same regression because, as shown in the following table, there is strong multicollinearity 
(VIF>10) between these four governance indicators: 
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Table 2: Internet broadband subscriptions and regulation (individual & global impacts of regulatory reforms) 
IV/GMM estimators robust to heteroskedasticity & and autocorrelation (Kernel=Bartlett; bandwith=2) with FE (country & year dummies included) 
Dependent variable: Ln (fixed broadband subscriptions) 
Model (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Estimation methods IV-2SLS 2S-GMM GMM-CUE IV-2SLS 2S-GMM GMM-
CUE 
IV-2SLS 2S-GMM GMM -CUE IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Ln(fixed broadband  subscriptions) t-1 0.2499
***
 
(0.0379) 
0.2501
***
  
(0.0379) 
0.2501
*** 
 (0.0379) 
0.2591
***
  
(0.0399) 
0.252
***
 
(0.0386) 
0.251
*** 
(0.038) 
0.227
***
 
(0.0321) 
0.227
***
 
(0.032) 
0.2269
*** 
(0.0320) 
0.2231
***
  
(0.0344) 
0.2265
***
  
(0.0342) 
0.2252
***
  
(0.0342) 
Overall reform 0.4571
*** 
(0.1503)
 
0.4655
*** 
 
(0.1477)
 
0.4657
***  
(0.1481)
 
         
Square of overall reform -0.0372
*** 
(0.0112)
 
-0.0378
*** 
(0.0111)
 
-0.0378
***  
(0.0111)
 
         
Entry regulation    0.6202
*** 
(0.142) 
0.614
*** 
(0.1413) 
0.614
*** 
(0.1409) 
      
Square of Entry regulation    -0.1151
*** 
(0.0236) 
-0.112
***
 
(0.0231) 
-0.112
*** 
(0.2304) 
 
 
     
Interconnection regime    -0.9511
+ 
(0.5924) 
-0.9923
*
 
(0.5884) 
-0.994
* 
(0.588) 
   -0.6204  
(0.8190) 
-0.6861  
(0.8103) 
-0.6416  
(8589) 
Square of  Interconnection regime    0.9507
+ 
 (0.5822) 
1.033
*
 
(0.573) 
1.036
*
  
(0.573) 
   0.7246  
(0.7025) 
0.9129  
(0.6824) 
0.8842 
 (0.7096) 
Transparency of interconnection terms    -1.3127
*** 
(0.3641) 
-1.3125
***
 
(0.3608) 
-1.314
*** 
(0.359) 
      
Square of  Transparency of inter. Terms    0.5575
*** 
(0.1632) 
0.5587
***
 
(0.1614) 
0.559
*** 
(0.160) 
      
Accounting separation    
 
  0.297
*
 
(0.18) 
0.306
*
 
(0.178) 
0.307
* 
(0.178) 
0.3116
*  
(0.1878)
 
0.3545
*  
(0.1842)
 
0.3490
* 
 
(0.1839)
 
Functional  separation    
 
  -0.391
**
 
(0.158) 
-0.394
**
 
(0.158) 
-0.394
** 
(0.158) 
-0.5295
*** 
(0.2020)
 
-0.4996
** 
(0.1995)
 
-0.4963
** 
(0.2058)
 
Infrastructure sharing    
 
     -0.1062
  
(0.2264)
 
-0.1949
  
(0.2209)
 
-0.2234
  
(0.2248)
 
Full local loop Unbundling    
 
     0.4467
  
(0.3441)
 
0.4573
  
(0.3397)
 
0.4422 
 
(0.3513)
 
Bitstream access          -0.2556
  
(0.2264)
 
-0.1941
  
(0.2206)
 
-0.1489 
(0.2279) 
Sub-loop access       -0.443** 
(0.218) 
-0.447
**
 
(0.217) 
-0.447
** 
(0.217) 
-0.5220
*
  
(0.2825) 
-0.6007
**
  
(0.2774) 
-0.6237
** 
(0.2877) 
Transparency of interconnection Agreements       0.325
* 
(0.197) 
0.3302
*
 
(0.197) 
0.3309
* 
(0.1975) 
0.3626
+ 
(0.2244)
 
0.4163
+ 
(0.2216)
 
0.438
* 
 (0.2234) 
Transparency of interconnection price       -0.626
***
 
(0.226) 
-0.626
***
 
(0.226) 
-0.626
*** 
(0.226) 
-0.5866
**  
(0.2465)
 
-0.6418
***  
(0.2440)
 
-0.6671
*** 
 (0.2455) 
Status of  SMP operator    
 
     0.0684
  
(0.3404)
 
0.1224
  
(0.3373)
 
0.1216 
  
(0.3434)
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Regulatory autonomous decision    
 
     0.3578
  
(0.3784)
 
0.2755
  
(0.3556) 
0.2704
  
 
(0.3614)
 
Ln(GDPpc) 1.7967
*** 
(0.4082) 
1.8127
***
 
(0.4048) 
1.8134
***
  
(0.4063) 
1.3098
***  
(0.4124)
 
1.281
*** 
(0.408) 
1.273
*** 
(0.403) 
1.459
***
 
(0.382) 
1.436
***
 
(0.377) 
1.436
*** 
(0.376) 
1.3273
***  
(0.4197)
 
1.2663
***  
(0.4120)
 
1.2831
***  
(0.4104)
 
Ln(Population) 0.8158* 
(0.4303)
 
0.8168
*  
(0.4303)
 
0.8168
*  
(0.4329)
 
1.1058
** 
(0.4737)
 
1.163
** 
(0.468) 
1.163
** 
 (0.467) 
1.877
***
 
(0.461) 
1.869
*** 
(0.460) 
1.870
*** 
(0.4594) 
1.9524
***  
(0.5440)
 
2.036
***  
(0.5389)
 
2.087
***  
(0.3614)
 
Number of observations 676 676 676 671 671 671 669 669 669 664 664 664 
Number of countries 104 104 104 103 103 103 104 104 104 103 103 103 
Second stage diagnostic             
R
2
 0.7098 0.6808 0.6798 0.693 0.693 0.6928 0.6914 0.691 0.691 0.6850 0.6761 0.6743 
Overall F statistic 71.2
*** 
35.84
*** 
34.47
*** 
50.79
*** 
52.1
*** 
52.03
*** 
51.08
*** 
51.26
*** 
51.18
*** 
34.19
***
 35.28
*** 
33.5
*** 
Endogenous regressors Overall reform, square of Overall 
reform 
Entry regulation; 
Square of Entry regulation; 
Interconnection regime; 
Square of  Interconnection; 
Transparency of interconnection terms; 
Square of transparency of 
interconnection terms 
Accounting separation; 
Functional separation; 
Sub-loop access; 
Transparency of interconnection agreements 
Transparency of interconnection price 
Interconnection regime;Square of 
interconnection regime ; Accounting 
separation;Functional separation; 
Infrastructure sharing;Full Local loop 
unbundling; Bitstream access; Sub-loop access;; 
Transparency of interconnection agreet. 
Transparency of interconnection price;Status of 
SMP operator;Regulatory autonomous decision 
Excluded instruments lagged Overall reform, lagged square 
of overall reform, lagged  Voice and 
Accountability 
One –year lags of endogenous  
regressors, Voice and 
Accountability; 
Regulation quality. 
One –year lags of endogenous  regressors 
Internet users (per 100 people); 
One-year lags of endogenous regressors ;One-
year lag of Regulatory quality; One-year lag of  
Voice and Accountability; Internet users (per 
100 people); 
First-stage diagnostics & post-estimation 
tests: (1) 
R
2 
 
Overall F statistic 
 
 
F test of  excluded instruments 
 
 
AP Chi-sq 
 
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of 
excluded instruments 
 
 
0.5662  ,  0.5640 
 
              
37.25
***
  ,    36.31
*** 
                              
                
                 59.75
***
 ,   58.85
***
 
 
                
                25.53
***   
,  22.81
***  
 
 
                 12.50
***
 ,  11.17
***
 
 
 
 
0.5904; 0.5739; 0.4309; 0.4458;0.326; 
0.305 
 
23.3
***
; 20.6
***
; 10.3
***
; 11.3
***
; 7.9
***
; 
7.6
***
 
 
14.9
***
; 20.6
***
; 18.2
***
; 20.4
***
; 10.1
***
; 
10.8
*** 
 
28.68
***
; 29.72
***
; 10.01
**
; 21.55
***
; 
7.8
**
; 8.3
** 
9.27
***
; 9.61
***
;  3.24**; 6.97***; 
2.55*; 2.71** 
 
 
0.4338;  0.4583; 0.428; 0.272; 0.3178 
 
 
11.5***;11.2***; 5.06***; 7.2***;7.79*** 
 
 
20.8***; 12.9***; 8.4***; 12.6***; 6.6*** 
 
 
119.0***;79.3***;37.8***;47.7***;36.2*** 
 
57.9***; 38.6***; 18.4***; 23.2***; 17.6*** 
 
 
0.4193, 0.4304, 0.4555, 0.4662, 0.4315, 0.4261, 
0.4709, 0.4465, 0.2849, 0.329, 0.3585, 0.2768 
 
6.78***, 7.3***, 9.34
***
,7.89
***
,7.71
***
,3.87
***
, 
7.57
***
, 3.35
***
,5.2
***
, 5.82
***
, 1.95
***
,1.48
*** 
 
8.53***, 9.15***, 12.6
***
,7.9
***
, 7.09
***
,4.97
***
, 
8.79
***
, 5.15
***
, 6.40
***
, 4.15
***
, 2.75
***
, 2.00
**
 
 
8.37
*
, 18.4
***
, 117.4
***
, 73.6
***
, 66.5
***
, 37.7
***
, 
66.4
***
, 36.27
***
,46.08
***
, 35.29
***
, 29.76
***
, 
19.03
***
 
2.0*,4.4***,28.1
***
,17.6
***
,15.9
***
,9.02
***
,15.89
*
**
,8.68
***
, 11.03
***
,8.45
***
,7.12
***
,4.55
***
 
S-Y critical values for single endogenous 
regressor (2SLS & 2S-GMM/CUE-GMM) 
5% maximal bias 
10% maximal bias 
 
 
                          13.91 
N.A. 
 
 
                       20.25/N.A. 
9.08/N.A. 
 
 
19.28/N.A. 
N.A. 
 
                                               
                              21.23/N.A. 
10.27/N.A. 
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20% maximal bias 
30% maximal bias 
10% maximal size 
15% maximal size 
20% maximal size 
25% maximal size 
N.A. 
N.A. 
19.93/8.68 
11.59/5.33 
8.75/4.42 
7.25/3.92 
6.46/N.A. 
5.39/N.A. 
22.3/6.46 
                       12.83 /4.36 
9.54/3.69 
7.8/3.32 
N.A. 
N.A. 
19.93/ 8.68 
11.59/5.33 
8.75/ 4.42 
7.25/3.92 
6.71/N.A. 
5.34/N.A. 
24.58/5.44 
13.96/3.87 
10.26/3.3 
8.31/2.98 
Underidentification test: Kleibergen-Paap 
rk LM statistic 
 
39.837
*** 
 
44.34*** 
 
30.443*** 
 
32.159
*** 
Overidentification test of all instruments: 
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 2SLS & 2S-
GMM/CUE-GMM 
 
0.093(0.761)/0.092(0.7613) 
 
0.728(0.6947) /0.725(0.6959) 
 
0.131(0.7176)/0.131(0.7176) 
 
3.318 (0.3451)/ 3.053(0.3836) 
Weak identification test :    Cragg-Donald 
Wald F static  
 
106.207 
18.966 
 
18.764 
 
4.97 
 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald : F static 50.335 8.797 6.513 2.236 
IV LM redundancy tests of specified 
excluded instrument: (2) 
 
42.285
***
, 47.421
***
, 6.093
***
 57.08***; 48.82***; 12.914**; 
20.215***; 36.392***; 38.496***; 
14.11**; 5.775. 21.683 
58.871***; 22.866***; 18.724***; 33.051***;  
29.257***;  8.726+ 
25.887**,  28.949
***
, 53.224
***
, 25.973
***
, 
54.067
***
, 47.421
***
, 29.229
***
,  
34.523
***
,35.395
***
, 22.295
***
, 9.617,  16.22, 
23.018
** 
12.207,58.245
*** 
 
Weak-instrument-robust inference tests:     
1/Anderson-Rubin Wald tests: 
F-test  
2/Stock-Wright LM S test: Chi-sq 
 
3.91
*** 
 
10.99
** 
 
                         4.7*** 
 
28.48*** 
 
                                 3.43*** 
 
14.8** 
 
                                 2.17
***
 
 
34.06
*** 
Endogeneity test  Chi-sq statistic (p-value) 6.839
**
 22. 45*** 13.311** 21.81
**
 
Notes:  In the first part of this table, we provide the results of estimations of each regression using respectively the IV-2SLS, 2S-GMM and GMM-CUE with fixed effects robust to heteroskedastic and autocorrelated erros. The 
statistical significance levels are presented by stars as follows: *** (significant at 1% level), ** (significant at 5% level), * (significant at 10% level), 
+
 (significant at 15% level). The robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
below the estimate coefficients.  The second stage diagnostics of each regression (see section 4.4.1.1) show that all models are well specified and globally significant. In particular, the high level of R
2 
show the importance of the 
contribution of the explanatory variables to explain the dependent variable while the high significance level of the overall F statics shows that all the coefficients of regressors are different than zero. In the second part of the table, 
for each regression, we provide the list of the endogenous regressors as well as the excluded instruments used in the first stage estimations.  In the rest of the table, we provide the first stage diagnostics and the post estimation tests 
(see Box 3 for a description of these tests).  The values of R
2
, the overall F statics and the F statics of excluded instruments, the AP Chi-statics, the AP F-statics correspond respectively to the first stage estimations of the list of 
endogenous regressors in the order followed in the table.  For specification C, we also compute redundancy tests for a set of instruments for further checks about validity of our instruments: (1) the set of instruments are Internet 
users (per 100 people);   One-year lag of Regulatory quality & One-year Lag of Voice and Accountability), we obtain  LM statics =59.808
***
 (p-value=0.0076). (2) The  instruments are : one year-lags of “Interconnection regime” & 
“Square of interconnection regime”, we obtain  LM statics 58.245*** (p-value= 0.0001) (3) The  instruments are one year-lags of “Transparency of interconnection price” & “Regulatory autonomous decision”, we find 43.763*** (p-
value= 0.0081). 
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Table 3: Internet broadband subscriptions and regulation (impacts across country classifications) 
IV/GMM estimators robust to heteroskedasticity & and autocorrelation (Kernel=Bartlett; bandwith=2) with FE (country & year dummies included) 
Dependent variable: Ln (fixed broadband subscriptions) 
Model (I) (II) (III) 
Estimation methods 2SLS 2step-GMM CUE-GMM 2SLS 2step-GMM CUE-GMM 2SLS 
2step-
GMM 
CUE-GMM 
Ln(fixed broadband  subscriptions) t-1 
0.225
***
 
(0.0331) 
0.225
*** 
(0.0331) 
0.225
*** 
(0.0331) 
0.222
***
 
(0.0339) 
0.225
***
 
(0.0339) 
0.231
***
 
(0.034) 
0.206
*** 
(0.206) 
0.205
*** 
(0.035) 
0.199
***
 
(0.035) 
Overall reform 0.442
*** 
(0.146) 
0.461
*** 
(0.143) 
0.461
*** 
(0.143) 
0.3
* 
(0.165) 
0.294
* 
(0.160) 
0.264
*
 
(0.159) 
0.455
***
 
(0.149) 
0.484
***
 
(0.144) 
0.492
***
 
(0.144) 
Square of Overall reform -0.044
*** 
(0.0108
)
 
-0.045
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.045
*** 
(0.010) 
-0.021
+
 
(0.013) 
-0.022
*
 
(0.013) 
-0.019
+ 
(0.013) 
-0.043
***
 
(0.011) 
-0.043
***
 
(0.01) 
-0.043
*** 
(0.01) 
Non OECD *Overall reform -0.104 
(0.0843) 
-0.103 
(0.084) 
-0.103 
(0.084) 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Non OECD*square of Overall reform 
0.0204
** 
(0.009) 
0.0202
**
 
(0.009) 
0.0202
** 
(0.009) 
 
 
 
 
 
      
H *Overall reform  
 
 
 
 
 
0.187
** 
(0.087) 
0.157
*
 
(0.084) 
0.194
** 
(0.084) 
     
H*square of Overall reform       
-0.024
** 
(0.01) 
-0.022
** 
(0.01) 
-0.025
** 
(0.01) 
    
 
 
UM *Overall reform 
            
-0.057 
(0.094) 
-0.0166 
(0.091) 
-0.014 
(0.09) 
UM*square of Overall reform             
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
0.04 
(0.011) 
LM *Overall reform 
            
-0.296
** 
(0.13) 
-0.266
** 
(0.126) 
-0.276
**
 
(0.125) 
LM*square of Overall reform             
0.035
** 
(0.016) 
0.031
**
 
(0.015) 
0.032
**
 
(0.015) 
L *Overall reform 
            
-0.683
** 
(0.3) 
-0.7203
** 
(0.308) 
-0.75
** 
(0.3) 
L*square of Overall reform             
0.112
* 
(0057) 
0.1106
*
 
(0.057) 
0.118
** 
(0.057) 
Ln(GDPpc) 
1.414
*** 
(0.367) 
1.397
*** 
(0.360) 
1.397
*** 
(0.360) 
1.473
*** 
(0.378) 
1.358
*** 
(0.369) 
1.481
*** 
(0.373) 
1.158
***
 
(0.381) 
1.158
*** 
(0.377) 
1.158
*** 
(0.369) 
Ln(Population) 
0.854
** 
(0.410) 
0.836
** 
(0.409) 
0.836
**
 
(0.411) 
0.941
***
 
(0.429) 
0.928
** 
(0.428) 
1.038
** 
(0.435) 
0.851
**
 
(0.407) 
0.851
** 
(0.405) 
0.851
** 
(0.403) 
Number of observations 669 669 669 669 669 669 664 664 664 
Number of countries 104 104 104 104 104 104 103 103 103 
Second stage diagnostic    
R
2
 
0.7092 0.7085 0.7084 0.7062 0.7061 0.7063 0.7068 0.7072 0.7038 
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Overall F statistic 59.69
*** 
63.66
*** 
63.41
*** 
58.52
*** 
62.61
*** 
63.79
*** 
50.72
*** 
51.63
*** 
50.78
*** 
Endogenous regressors 
Overall reform; square of overall reform, 
 Non OECD *overall reform, 
Non OECD *square of Overall reform 
Overall reform; square of overall reform, 
 H *overall reform, 
H *square of Overall reform 
Overall reform; square of overall reform; 
UM *overall reform; UM *square of 
Overall reform; LM *overall reform; LM 
*square of Overall reform; L *overall 
reform, L *square of Overall reform 
Excluded instruments 
one year lags of endogenous regressors;  
one year lags of Voice and Accountability; 
Internet users (per 100 people) 
 
one year lags of endogenous regressors;  
one year lags of Voice and Accountability ; 
 Internet users (per 100 people);  
H* one year lags of Voice and Accountability 
one year lags of endogenous regressors; 
one year lags of Voice and Accountability ; 
one year lags of  regulatory quality; 
Internet users  
(per 100 people) 
First-stage diagnostics & post-estimation tests: (1) 
R
2
 
0.5706;  0.5694; 0.4775; 0.5224 0.5682; 0.5674; 0.6196;0.6031 
0.5711;  0.5702; 0.4637; 0.4669; 0.3975; 
0.3513; 0.2655; 0.1494; 
Overall F statistic 30.40
***
; 30.5
***
; 23.26
***
; 20.33
***
 29.27***;29.06***; 23.93***; 24.52***  24.99***;23.26***; 11.83***.; 11.93***; 
 7.99***; 5.92*** 1.86**;  
F test of  excluded instruments 
31.98***; 33.8***; 24.96***; 28.22*** 27.7***; 30.12***; 31.47***; 36.56*** 
17.3***;; 18.1***;15.4***;16.49***; 
11.2***; 8.3***;2.3***; 1.7* 
AP Chi-sq 
20.95***; 12.14***; 27.67**; 31.06***; 16.82
***
; 13.24
***
; 14.99
**
; 12.04
***
 
21.18***;18.86***;7.32+; 7.04+;7.71+; 
4.71; 4.38; 2.81 
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments 
6.80
***
; 3.94
***
;  8.98***; 10.08***; 4.09
***
; 3.22
**
; 3.64
***
 ; 2.92
**
 
5.11
***
; 4.55
***
; 1.76
+
; 1.7
+
 1.86
+
; 1.14; 
1.06; 0.68; 
S-Y critical values for single endogenous regressor (2SLS & 2S-GMM/CUE-GMM) 
5% maximal bias 
10% maximal bias 
20% maximal bias 
30% maximal bias 
10% maximal size 
15% maximal size 
20% maximal size 
25% maximal size 
19.28/N.A. 
9.08/N.A. 
6.46/N.A. 
5.39/N.A. 
22.3/6.46 
12.83/4.36 
9.54/3.69 
7.8/3.32 
19.86/N.A. 
10.27/N.A. 
6.71/N.A. 
5.34/N.A. 
24.58/5.44 
13.96/3.87 
10.26/3.30 
8.31/2.98 
20.90/N.A. 
10.27/N.A. 
6.71N.A. 
5.34/N.A. 
24.58/5.44 
13.96/3.87 
10.26/3.3 
8.31/2.98 
Underidentification test: Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 47*** 47.929*** 11.265** 
Overidentification test of all instruments:  
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 2SLS & 2S-GMM/CUE-GMM 
0.388(0.8238) /0.386(0.824) 5.298(0.1513) /5.526 (0.1371) 4.527(0.2098) /4.528(0.2098) 
Weak identification test :    Cragg-Donald Wald F static  46.219 41.039 4.527 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald : F static 22.454 21.752 0.956 
IV LM redundancy tests of specified instrument: (2) 
 
17.871***; 22.277***; 10.039**; 18.697***;  
 8.529*;  10.803** 
35.647***; 37.542***; 35.488**; 
 52.572***; 18.064***;  6.932+; 13.506** 
 
35.818***; 20.88***; 44.36***; 51.81***;  
55.823***; 49.368***; 35.81***; 
20.88***; 8.765; 15.98**; 24.1*** 
Weak-instrument-robust inference tests:     
1/Anderson-Rubin Wald tests: 
F-test  
2/Stock-Wright LM S test: Chi-sq 
 
4.85*** 
23.51***  
   
 
5.05*** 
22.66***  
   
 
3.22*** 
26.66**  
   
Endogeneity test  Chi-sq statistic (p-value) 14.105*** 14.201*** 16.292** 
Notes: Statistical significance levels:  *** (1% level), ** (5% level), * (10% level), 
+
 (15% level). We also report robust standard errors in parenthesis.  (1) We report first stage diagnostic for respectively each 
endogenous regressors considered (2) See the list of excluded instruments in the middle of the table. See Box N°3 for description of tests applied and reported in this table. 
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5.2 Estimation results: implications and comparisons 
    The exam of the first parts of tables 2 and 3 show that results not differ systematically across 
regressions and estimation methods used in this study. We can summarize the main finding in the 
following points: 
   The dynamic adjustment process of the broadband deployment  
    The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables (Ln(fixed broadband  subscriptions) t-1), are 
highly significant (at 1% level) and positive across all our specifications, which is consistent with 
expectations. The magnitudes of these coefficients are quite similar across different regressions 
performed in this study (they are between about 0.19 and 0.25. Results imply that the investment in 
broadband has high persistent time effects. Broadband deployment follows therefore a long term 
adjustment process. The positive sign can be interpreted as follows: the higher the stock of broadband 
investment across previous years, the higher its current variation. More precisely, according to our 
estimations, a 10% increase in the current stock of broadband infrastructures lead to an average 
increase by around 2% in the next year.  This result on dynamic adjustment process of telecom 
infrastructure deployment is consistent with related empirical finding that consider dynamic 
specifications (e.g., Li and Xu 2004; Alesina et al.2005; Heimeshoff 2007; Friederiszick, Grajek, and 
Röller 2008 ; Li 2008; Djiofack-Zebaze and Keck 2009; Bouckaert, Dijk, and Verboven 2010;  Bauer 
and Shim 2012; Grajek and Röller 2012; Gruber and Koutroumpis 2012; Baccache, Brourreau and 
Gaudin, 2013; Nardatto, Valleti and Verboven 2014). 
       The important contribution of the national income on broadband deployment 
   The coefficients of logarithm of per capita GDP are highly significant (at 1% level) and positive 
across all our regressions. These results are also consistent with expectations. Their magnitudes vary 
from 1.15 to 1.82. We can interpret this finding as follows:  a 10% increase in GDP per capita leads to 
an average increase of broadband deployment by around 14% . This result shows the importance of 
contribution of national income in increasing broadband deployment in countries across the world. 
The integrality of various related empirical studies consider that income measured by GDP is the main 
determinant of telecom investment and share common result on strong positive relationship between 
income and telecom innovation. 
      The Population size is an important determinant of broadband deployment 
The coefficients of logarithm of population size are positive but their significance level and magnitude 
respectively vary from 0.81 to 2.08 across different specifications considered. These results are 
consistent with expectations.  This shows that the population is also an important determinant of 
broadband deployment. The higher the population, the higher the broadband subscriptions (cetirus 
paribus) and therefore the broadband deployment. Precisely, a 10% increase in population size leads to 
an average increase of broadband deployment by around 12.1%. This result on strong positive 
correlation between population size and broadband deployment confirms the finding of the previous 
empirical related studies (e.g., Martha 2005; Bauer and Shim 2012; Gruber and Koutroumpis 2012). 
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      The impact of the common unobserved macro-economic factors on the broadband deployment 
 Results show high statistical significance for all trends of year dummies (see Table B in the 
Appendix). Specially, trend for year 2005 is positive and very high (more than 1.31) meaning that the 
common unobserved favorable macro-economic factors have contributed significantly to accelerate 
broadband adoption by a minimum average of about 131% relatively to 2004. However, since 2006, 
year trends became negative and decreasing (in absolute value). This may be due to financial crises of 
2006, the United States American financial bubble of 2006 that propagates to overall economics 
across the world since 2006
27
. 
      The Impacts of the regulatory reforms on broadband deployment 
    Turning now on impacts of our variables of interest (aggregated and disaggregated regulatory 
measurements), results lead to three conclusions: 
  The regulation and broadband deployment: an inverted U relationship 
  The Overall regulation and entry regulation coefficients are highly significant (at 1% levels) and 
positive while the coefficients of both squares of overall regulation and entry regulation measures are 
highly significant (at 1% level) and negative (see regressions A and B / table 2), suggesting that the 
regulation-broadband penetration relationship is an inverted-U-shape. A direct mathematical 
interpretation of this result is the following: regulation is positively correlated with broadband 
penetration for low level of regulation and negatively correlated with broadband penetration for high 
level of regulation. This result confirms the previous empirical works that use measurements of 
competition (such that market shares of providers or number of operators) to measure regulation (e.g.,  
Heimeshoff 2007;  Li 2008; Briglauer, Ecker and Gugler2013) which support both the theoretical and 
empirical finding on inverted U form relationship between competition and innovation demonstrated 
by the economic researches (see, Aghion et al. 2005;  Innui, Kawakami and Miyagawa 2008, Hashmi 
2011;  Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt 2013; Goettler and Gordon 2014). In fact, our aggregated 
measurements of telecom reforms reflect the intensity of regulation required to incumbent firm in 
order to avoid its anti-competitive behaviors and thereby promote service-based competition. We can 
explain our result on inverted-U relationship basing on the interpretation of Aghion et al. (2005) and 
Aghion, Akcigit, and Howitt (2013) as follows: for low degree of regulation (therefore low degree of 
competition) , infrastructure owner escapes from competition by innovation (escape effect). After 
certain level of regulation and thereby competition, infrastructure owners’ profits earned from 
broadband deployment cannot cover the costs of investment because the high level of competition 
resulting from severe access regulation policy yields on decreasing retail sales of infrastructure owners 
by reducing final prices (the Schumpeterian effect). However, our finding contrasts with the results of 
Friederiszick, Grajek, and Röller (2008), Grajek and Röller (2012) and Bauer and Shim (2012) that 
show a strict negative impact of regulation on investment. However, we have some reproaches to these 
studies. Firstly, Friederiszick, Grajek, and Röller (2008) and Grajek and Röller (2012) do not consider 
a non-linear model to estimate the relationship between regulation and investment. Secondly, the 
closest study to our one, Bauer and Shim (2012) use limit number of observations (232 observations 
versus about 671 in our study) they not control for possibly problems of heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelated erros .  
 
                                                             
27 See Chang (2011) for a review of the issues of the “financial crisis 2007-2010”. 
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The Individual and the join impacts of regulatory reforms 
    Regarding the impacts of the access price regime and the square of access price regime, the 
transparency of access terms and the square of transparency of access terms (see model B / Table 2), 
we obtain the following results. The coefficient of the access price regime is significant at 15% level 
but negative and the square of access price regime has significant and positive coefficient. These mean 
that the intensity of access pricing regulation is negatively correlated with broadband adoption: the 
lower the access price, the higher the broadband penetration and vice versa. Otherwise, requiring 
severe access price policy (e.g. LRIC model) undermines investment while less intense access price 
policy (e.g. price cap, retail minus,) or no control at all spurs broadband deployment. This confirms 
the result of Bauer and Shim (2012) and many other empirical works. Precisely, Chang, Koski and 
Majundar (2003) find a negative impact of access price on the share in fiber optic or digital lines in 
USA. Distaso, Lupi and Maneuti (2005) and Waverman et al. (2007) show that the access price (the 
price of local loop unbundling) affects negatively the broadband deployment measured by broadband 
subscriptions in Europe. Seo and Shin (2011) find that price cap regime has ameliorated the 
productivity of the USA telecom firms. Further, the negative and the highly significant coefficient of 
transparency of access terms show the negative effect of this obligation required to incumbent on 
broadband adoption. These results gives more explanation of the inverted-U-shaped relationship 
between broadband penetration and overall regulation: more extensive regulation such that requiring 
severe access regulation to incumbent operator such that a strong regulation of access price (cost based 
models such that FDC to LRIC method) and imposing the principle of transparency of access terms,  
or imposing to incumbent firm high intensity of entry regulation measure reduce broadband 
investment while a less severe regulation that consists to require to incumbent a moderate access price 
policy such that a price cap regime or to  impose a limit number of entry regulation measurements 
seems necessary to foster investment in broadband networks.  
   These results are confirmed again by considering more disaggregated regulation reform measures 
(see models C & D/ Table 2). Indeed, our general conception about the regulation-broadband adoption 
relationship is that a less extensive regulation stimulates investment while more extensive regulation 
impedes investment remain unchanged. Results show that Accounting separation, the weakest degree 
of separation, is positively associated with broadband penetration across different models considered 
while the more stringent degree of separation, the functional separation, negatively affects broadband 
penetration. For the unbundling policies, results show that only the coefficient of the most extensive 
unbundling policies, the sub-loop access is statistically significant (at 10% and 5%) level and has a 
negative sign, which confirms the results of Wallsten (2006).  
The impact of the overall regulation across countries classifications 
     Regarding the impact of the overall regulation on broadband adoption across countries 
classifications, we interact the overall regulation and its square with dummies for OECD countries 
(specification I), high income countries (specification II) and  the Upper middle, the Low middle and 
the Low income countries (specification III) (see table 3).   
  Results of the FE-2SLS, the FE-2step-GMM and the FE-CUE-GMM estimations can be summarized 
in the two following points:     
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o The coefficient of the overall regulation measure is highly significant (at 1% level) and 
positive for OECD countries but negative, although not significant for non OECD countries while the 
coefficient of square regulation reform is highly significant (at 1% level) and negative for OECD 
countries but positive and statistically significant (at 5% level) for non OECD countries. Therefore, in 
OECD countries, the relationship between broadband penetration and regulation is an inverted-U-
shaped while it is ambiguous in the rest of the world.  
o Specifications II and III provide more clarification and precision to identify this relationship 
across the world. Precisely results show that in high income countries, this relationship is an inverted 
U-shaped. In the rest of the world, this relationship takes U form meaning that access regulation has 
strict negative impact on broadband deployment. Indeed, coefficients of overall regulation are 
significant and negative while their respective squares are positive and significant, except those 
interacted with dummy of the middle income countries which have same correspond signs but not 
significant. This non-significance may be due to problem of week instruments for specification III (see 
the next paragraph). We explain this last problem by the important numbers of the endogenous 
regressors considered in this last specification. 
   Our explanation to these last results is the following:  
o The non-significance of the coefficient of overall regulation for non-OECD countries casts 
doubts on the goodness of this classification (OECD/Non-OECD) to understand the impacts of 
regulation on broadband penetration across countries in the world. Precisely, this classification only 
permits to identify this relationship for OECD countries but not for the rest of the world. In particular, 
For OECD countries, this relationship can be described as follows:  a less extensive regulatory policy 
stimulates broadband adoption while more extensive policy undermines investment in broadband 
networks. 
o However, it seems that the World Bank classification by income levels is more convenient to 
clarify the regulation-broadband penetration relationship across the world. Considering the World 
Bank classifications, there are two cases. In high income countries, as noted above, the inverted U-
form of the curve that depicts regulation-broadband penetration relationship implies that a less 
extensive regulatory policy stimulates broadband adoption while more extensive policy undermines 
investment in broadband networks. However, regarding the rest of the world, it seems that in these 
countries, the relationship between regulation and broadband deployment takes U-form which means 
that regulation affects negatively broadband investment. This may be due to the fact that in general the 
existent fixed broadband infrastructures in poor countries are not already sufficiently developed 
compared to those in more reach world and therefore regulation may discourage facility-based entry, 
which seems the sole solution to build immediately advanced network infrastructures in these 
countries. 
5.3 Robustness of the results: post-estimation diagnostic tests 
Results of diagnostic tests (see the last part of tables 2 and 3) permit the following conclusions for 
each specification considered: 
▫ Chi-squared statistic of endogeneity test applied to the subset of endogenous regressors 
considered is highly significant (at 1% and 5% levels), which implies that the use of 2SLS/GMM 
methods as estimators is appropriate. 
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▫ The overall F-statistics of first stage equations are highly significant (at 1% and 5% levels), 
which implies that the instruments used to explain the endogenous regressor are jointly significant. 
However, there are some exceptions. In particular, in specification III/ Table 3, the F-statistic (equal to 
1.33) of first-stage equation that explains the endogenous regressor, which is the interacted term of 
square of overall regulation with the low-income countries dummies, is not significant.  
▫ F-tests of excluded instruments reject its null hypothesis (F statistics are significant) which 
implies that the excluded instruments used to explain the endogenous regressor considered are relevant 
(except some exceptions in specification III/ Table 3). 
▫ Both statistics (F and Chi-squared) of the Angrist-Pistache tests are significant, which confirm 
the previous results that the excluded instruments used are relevant and appropriate to identify the 
endogenous regressors considered. (except specification III/3, for which the Angrist-Pistache tests 
fails to reject its null hypothesis for some first-stage equations). 
▫ The results of under-identification tests are consistent with the conclusion of valididy of our 
instruments. Indeed, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics are highly significant (at 1% level), which 
indicates that the rank condition of matrix of coefficients of first-stage equations is satisfied and 
therefore the excluded instruments are relevant to explain the variation of the endogenous regressors. 
▫ The significant results of different redundancy tests applied to one or more specific 
instruments also confirm this finding on validity of our instruments. 
▫ The Hansen J test fails to reject its null hypothesis (high p-value of Hansen J statistic) which 
implies that the endogeneity conditions of instruments are also satisfied. 
▫ The weak-instrument-robust inference tests reject their null hypothesis (statistics F and Chi-
squared of Anderson-Rubin Wald test and chi-squared of Stock-Wright LM S test are significant) 
indicating that the instruments are valid and the endogenous regressors considered are jointly 
significant in main equation. 
▫ Despite that the weak identification tests of Stock and Yogo (2005) are not appropriate to 
study the strength of our instruments in our case (see Box N°3) because the critical values computed 
by Stock and Yogo (2005) require that both homoskedasticitic and non- autocorrelated errors 
assumptions are satisfied, the most considered appropriate statistics, which is Kleibergen-Paap Wald 
rk F statistics, are superior to critical values computed by Stock and Yogo (2005) . Nevertheless, to 
ensure more consistency for our estimation results, we always perform, for each specification, a 
GMM-CUE estimator which is considered the less sensible IV method to weak identification problem 
as noted above. The estimation results of this last method are very similar to results obtained using 
2SLS or 2S-GMM, which confirm again the consistency of our estimation results.  
     To summarize, post-estimation diagnostic tests permit to conclude that our estimations are 
consistent . Indeed, our choice to estimate regulation-broadband penetration relationship using 
2SLS/GMM methods with fixed effects and robust errors is appropriate, instruments used for each 
regression are valid and endogenous regressors are jointly significant in main equations. 
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6. Conclusion and Policy recommandations 
    In this study, we have investigated the individual, the joint and the global effects on the broadband 
deployment of the following regulatory reforms: access pricing regimes, unbundling and separation 
policies & the obligation of transparency of access price and aggreements, using an heterogeneous 
panel including both developed and developing countries over the period of 2004-2011and following a 
robust empirical methodology.  
    Results suggest that the relationship between regulation and broadband deployment is an inverted U 
shape in reach countries while it takes U form in more poor countries. This means that in the first class 
of countries, a low level of access regulation (leading to low competition intensity) spurs innovation in 
telecom industry while a high level of access regulation (leading to more competition) undermines 
investment in broadband infrastructures. In particular, no control to a less intense access price 
regulation that consists to apply moderate access pricing regime that offer certain access margin for 
incumbent firm such that price cap or retail minus permits to drive innovation while the stringent 
access policy which consists to require cost-based models (LRIC, FDC) impedes broadband 
deployment. In the same, requiring extensive unbundling policy (sub-loop access) as well as extensive 
separation policies (operational, functional or structural separation) undermines broadband investment. 
However, in more poor countries access regulation has a strict negative impact on telecom innovation. 
In fact, in these countries, the existent infrastructure networks are not sufficiently developed compared 
to those in reach countries.  
Our analysis provides the following main policy recommendations for telecom industry development: 
    - Regulators in poor countries must immediately encourage facility-based entry by reducing or even 
stopping access regulation requirements imposed to incumbent firms (in general the owners of 
network infrastructure, the major suppliers) in order to promote foreign investments in 
telecommunications fixed infrastructures.  
- Regulators should follow moderate regulatory policy in developed world in order to promote 
broadband deployment.   
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Appendix 
Table A. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group  Variable Mean 
(overall) 
Std.Dev Min Max Observations 
(1)  Ln(fixed broadband subscriptions)  10.986 4.722 -6.158 18.868 N = 806/ n = 106/ T-bar =7.603 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 Functional separation .0782 .268 0 1 N =  856/ n = 107/ T =  8 
Infrastructure sharing .6091 .488 0 1 N =  856/ n =107/  T = 8 
Full Local loop unbundling .537 .498 0 1 N =  856/ n =107/  T = 8 
Bitstream access .424 .494 0 1 N = 856/ n =107/ T = 8 
Sub-loop access .240 .427 0 1 N = 856/ n = 107/ T = 8 
Entry regulation 2.495 1.807         0          6 N = 856/ n = 107/ T =8 
Interconnection regime .746 .320 0 1 N = 856/ n = 107/ T = 8 
Transparency of interconnection agreements .484 .500 0 1 N = 856/ n = 107/T = 8 
Transparency of interconnection price .699 .458 0 1 N = 856 /n = 107/ T = 8 
Market transparency 1.184 .842 0 2 N = 856/ n = 107/ T = 8 
Status of SMP operator .272 .445 0 1 N = 856/ n = 107/ T =  8 
Regulatory autonomous decision .8644 .342 0 1 N = 856 /n = 107/ T =  8 
Overall reform 5.562 2.454 0 10 N = 856/ n = 107/ T =  8 
Overall reform index .505 .223 0 .909 N = 856 /n = 107/ T = 8 
Entry reform index .415 .301 0 1 N =  856 /n = 107/ T = 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
 Ln(GDPpc) 8.326 1.542 5.458 11.590 N = 838 / n=106 /T = 7.9 
Ln(Population) 15.986 2.022 10.44 21.019 N = 856/ n=107/ T=8 
School enrollment secondary 85.267 24.765 10.82 149.83 N = 636/  n=102/T-bar = 6.2 
School  enrollment tertiary 42.916 24.532 1.176 95.072 N = 563/  n=97/ T-bar = 5.8 
Urban population 62.256 21.416 13.01 100 N =856/ n =    107/ T =       8 
Age 64.898 5.974 48.65 85.52 N =824/  n=103/T=8 
Main tel. lines per 100 people 25.203 19.979 .167 99.049 N = 850/n=107/ T = 7.94393 
Internet users (per 100 people) 36.005 27.411 .199 95.02 N = 841/n =  107/ T-bar =7.859 
Regulatory Quality .369 .891 -2.210 1.931 N = 847/n = 106/ T-bar =7.990 
Voice and Accountability .212 .960 -1.843 1.826 N =856/ n =  107/ T =8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Europe & Central Asia (WB) .157 .364 0 1 N =   856/ n =107/ T =8 
High income: Non OECD (WB) .235 .424 0 1 N =   856/ n =107/ T = 8 
High income: OECD (WB) .133 .339 0 1 N =   856/ n =107/ T =8 
Middle East & North Africa (WB) .078 .268 0 1 N =   856/ n = 107/ T =8 
Latin America & Caribbean (WB) .170 .376 0 1 N =   856/ n =107/ T = 8 
East Asia & Pacific (WB) .065 .247 0 1 N = 856/ n = 107/ T = 8 
Sub-Saharan Africa (WB) .112 .315 0 1 N = 856/ n = 107/ T = 8 
South Asia (WB) .046 .211 0 1 N = 856/ n =  107/ T =       8 
2 OPEP .074 .263 0 1 N = 856/ n =     107/ T =       8 
3 Non- OECD .731 .443 0 1 N =  856/ n =     107/ T =       8 
4 Non-EU  countries .764 .424 0 1 N =    856/ n =     107/ T =       8 
5 Developing countries  (IMF) .742 .437 0 1 N =    856/ n =     107/ T =       8 
6 Developing countries  (UN) .654 .475 0 1 N =    856/ n =     107/ T =       8 
 
 
7 
High income (WB) .369 .482 0 1 N =    856/ n =     107/ T =       8 
Upper-Middle income (WB) .240 .427 0 1 N =    856/ n =     107/ T =       8 
Low-Middle-income (WB) .241 .428 0 1 N =    856/ n =     107/ T =       8 
Low-income (WB) .143 .350 0 1 N =    856/ n =     107/ T =       8 
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Figure A. Evolution of Fixed Broadband Subscriptions per 100 people over 2004-2011 
Countries grouped by income level 
High -Income countries Low-middle income Low-income 
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Figure B. Evolution of Overall regulation measure over countries 
High-income countries (grouped as OECD & non-OECD)/ other countries (grouped by region) 
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Figure C. Evolution of regulation measures over period 2004-2011 (by country) 
Classification by level of income 
Graph 1 : High Income Countries 
 
 
Graph 2 : Upper-Middle Income Countries 
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                                                                                        Graph3 : Low-Middle Income Countries 
 
 
Graph 4 : Low Income Countries 
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A Summary of the econometric methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preliminary & post estimation Tests 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test (B-PLM test) : (Conclusion: Random effects estimator  is better than OLS estimator) 
Hausman test: (Conclusion: Fixed effects estimator is better than OLS estimator 
The “modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity”: (conclusion: there is a problem of heteroskedastic errors) 
Wooldridge tests for serial correlation: (conclusion: there is a problem of autocorrelated errors)  
Robust Hausman test (to take into account problem of heteroskedastic and autocorrelated erros): 
Wald test (for year dummies): 
Robust fixed effects with cluster on countries (year dummies included) 
Diagnostics: 
Including fixed effects results in high R-squared compared to R-squared of OLS regressions  
Yet, we obtain unpredicted signs of estimates of controls thatwe  have doubt their possible correlation with GDPpc (which 
confirm the multi-collinearity between controls, except population) 
Fixed effects estimator is also not appropriate for dynamic models. 
 
 
 
IV/GMM methods (2SLS, 2S- GMM, GMM-CUE) with fixed effects robust to heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelated errors (year dummies included) 
(These methods are used to control for reverse causality between regulatory variables and broadband deployment. These 
methods also  permit better results for dynamic models compared to usual methods (OLS with and without fixed effects))  
N.B.: 2SLS is a specific case of GMM that provide better results than 2S-GMM and GMM-CUE when instruments are 
strong, number of observations is important (exceed 700 observations) and there is no problem of heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelated errors. 
2S-GMM is better than 2SLS and GMM-CUE when there are problem of heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors. 
GMM-CUE is better when instruments are weak and number of observations is low enough. 
 
Preliminary and post-estimations tests 
 
 (Hausman tests for IV, Pagan-Hall IV heteroskedasticity test, Endogeneity tests for set of endogenous regressors (Durbin-
Wu-Hausman), F-tests of first stage, F-tests of excluded instruments, The Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage chi-squared (tests 
of under-identification), Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments: (tests of weak identification), Weak 
identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic & Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic), The underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic), Weak-instrument-robust inference tests (Anderson-Rubin (1949) test & Stock-Wright 
(2000) test), IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments), Hansen J test (Sargan-Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions)) 
These tests confirm the choice of these methods and the consistency of our estimation results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multi-collinearity tests 
(Results: In general, according to VIF values, no problem of multi-collineariry detected 
However, there are possibly problems of multi-collinearities between GDP & other controls (except population) given the 
high values of coefficients of correlation.) 
(we assume that OLS hypothesis hold) 
OLS regressions 
Diagnostics:  
Unpredicted signs of estimates of controls that have correlated with GDPpc 
F-tests: models are globally significant 
Ramsey Reset tests: there are problems of misspecification and omitted variable in regressions that include lagged dependent 
variables 
Low R-squared in certain cases 
Conclusion 
We should take into account unobserved heterogeneities 
OLS estimator is not appropriate for dynamic models Baltagi (2005, p.135 and p.13). 
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Table B: Year dummies (estimates) 
Specification Estimation Method Estimate Coefficients for respectively years: 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 
(with corresponding robust standard errors) 
 
 
       A 
 
 
 
IV-2SLS                        1.91
***
(0.474), -0.65
***
(0.088),-0.43
***
(0.071), 
                      -0.33
***
(0.063),-0.15
**
(0.062), -0.083
+
(0.053) 
2S-GMM                        1.91
***
(0.474), -0.65
***
(0.088),-0.43
***
(0.071), 
                      -0.33
***
(0.063),-0.15
**
(0.062), -0.082
+
(0.053)
 
CUE-GMM                      1.91
***
(0.474), -0.65
***
(0.089),-0.43
***
(0.071), 
                      -0.33
***
(0.063),-0.15
**
(0.062), -0.082
+
(0.053)
 
 
 
        B 
IV-2SLS                          1.95
***
(0.506),-0.68
***
(0.092),-0.44
***
(0.076), 
                      -0.31
***
(0.065), -0.14
**
(0.067),-0.081
+
(0.055)
 
2S-GMM                         1.87
***
(0.489),-0.68
***
(0.091),-0.45
***
(0.074), 
                      -0.31
***
(0.065), -0.15
**
(0.066),-0.084
+
(0.055)
 
CUE-GMM                        1.86
***
(0.484),-0.68
***
(0.090),-0.45
***
(0.074), 
                      -0.31
***
(0.065), -0.15
**
(0.066),-0.085
+
(0.055)
 
 
 
       C 
IV-2SLS                          1.59
***
(0.411),-0.75
***
(0.086),-0.50
***
(0.074), 
                      -0.36
***
(0.063), -0.17
**
(0.062),-0.0981
*
(0.054)
 
2S-GMM                         1.58
***
(0.411),-0.75
***
(0.086),-0.50
***
(0.074), 
                      -0.36
***
(0.063), -0.17
**
(0.062),-0.0981
*
(0.054)
 
CUE-GMM                        1.58
***
(0.410),-0.75
***
(0.086),-0.50
***
(0.074), 
                      -0.36
***
(0.063), -0.17
**
(0.062),-0.097
*
(0.054)
 
 
 
       D 
IV-2SLS                          1.51
***
(0.449),-0.75
***
(0.097),-0.48
***
(0.083), 
                      -0.35
***
(0.069), -0.16
***
(0.066),-0.094
+
(0.057)
 
2S-GMM                         1.56
***
(0.444),-0.75
***
(0.096),-0.48
***
(0.080), 
                      -0.34
***
(0.068), -0.17
***
(0.065),-0.089
+
(0.057)
 
CUE-GMM                        1.55
***
(0.447),-0.75
***
(0.097),-0.48
***
(0.082), 
                      -0.34
***
(0.070), -0.17
***
(0.066),-0.089
+
(0.058)
 
 
 
        I 
IV-2SLS                          1.55
***
(0.426),-0.74
***
(0.087),-0.49
***
(0.071), 
                      -0.39
***
(0.063), -0.206
***
(0.061),-0.010
*
(0.053)
 
2S-GMM                         1.55
***
(0.426),-0.74
***
(0.087),-0.49
***
(0.071), 
                      -0.39
***
(0.063), -0.207
***
(0.061),-0.010
*
 (0.053)
 
CUE-GMM                        1.55
***
(0.426),-0.74
***
(0.087),-0.49
***
(0.071), 
                      -0.39
***
(0.062), -0.207
***
(0.061),-0.010
*
 (0.053)
 
 
 
       II 
IV-2SLS                          1.53
***
(0.440),-0.75
***
(0.089),-0.50
***
(0.072), 
                      -0.39
***
(0.062), -0.19
***
(0.060),-0.010
*
(0.053)
 
2S-GMM                         1.54
***
(0.440),-0.74
***
(0.089),-0.49
***
(0.072), 
                      -0.38
***
(0.062), -0.18
***
(0.060),-0.096
*
(0.052)
 
CUE-GMM                        1.63
***
(0.440),-0.73
***
(0.09),-0.48
***
(0.072), 
                      -0.37
***
(0.062), -0.17
***
(0.060),-0.092
*
(0.052)
 
 
 
      III 
 
IV-2SLS                          1.33
***
(0.448),-0.74
***
(0.089),-0.48
***
(0.072), 
                      -0.36
***
(0.067), -0.17
**
(0.060),-0.011
**
(0.054)
 
2S-GMM                         1.36
***
(0.448),-0.72
***
(0.089),-0.47
***
(0.071), 
                      -0.34
***
(0.066), -0.16
**
(0.064),-0.011
**
(0.054)
 
CUE-GMM                        1.31
***
(0.448),-0.72
***
(0.087),-0.47
***
(0.070), 
                      -0.34
***
(0.066), -0.16
**
(0.064),-0.011
**
(0.054)
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